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Abstract 
A range of socio-economic dislocations have spawned renewed interest in 
the capitalist system and its critiques. Within these trends, the politics of 
international trade has often been a flashpoint for civil society organisations 
(CSOs) concerned with social justice. This paper uncovers a neglected 
feature of this landscape: how, since the 1980s, certain CSOs have shifted 
from being ‘radical outsiders’ to ‘reformist insiders’ to protest the design and 
purpose of global trade. We know why CSOs have criticised the political 
economy of trade, but less about how they have historically struggled to 
gain admission into this policy milieu; their internal strategising and 
tensions; and what makes for effective protest. To understand such 
experimentation, this paper argues that literature on professionalisation 
offers a valuable lens for exploring the relationship between expertise and 
power. Dovetailing with other research in IPS, it adapts Bourdieu’s 
comparatively underused concept of scientific capital to explicate how 
certain, prized dispositional qualities were acquired and practiced for the 
purpose of registering policy impact. This argument is developed through 
the case of Oxfam. When viewed historically, the paper suggests that a 
professionalised, activist subjectivity has emerged within certain CSOs, 
defined here under a new ideal-type notion of the ‘critical technician’. 
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In recent years, a range of socio-economic dislocations – including the fall-out 
from the global financial crisis; material inequities in many countries; and 
contestations around populism – have spawned renewed interest in the 
capitalist system and its critiques (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006; Gamble 2014; 
Streeck 2014, 2016). Within these larger trends, the politics of international 
trade has often been a flashpoint for a range of civil society organisations 
(CSOs) concerned with social justice. Through contesting why the structures 
and rules of the trading system often take uneven political and distributional 
forms, CSOs have problematised trade diplomacy for many governments and 
international organisations. This paper uncovers a neglected feature of this 
landscape: how, since the 1980s, certain CSOs have shifted from being ‘radical 
outsiders’ to ‘reformist insiders’ in order to protest the design and purpose of 
global trade. We know why CSOs have criticised the political economy of 
commercial exchange, but much less about how they have historically 
struggled to gain admission into this particular policy milieu; their internal 
strategising and tensions; and what makes for effective protest. In order to 
understand such experimentation, this paper argues that the literature on the 
politics of professionalisation offers a valuable lens for exploring the 
relationship between expertise and power. Dovetailing with other research in 
international political sociology (IPS), it adapts Pierre Bourdieu’s comparatively 
underused concept of scientific capital in order to explicate how certain, prized 
dispositional qualities were acquired and practiced for the purpose of 
registering policy impact. The paper develops this argument through a case 
study on Oxfam. When viewed historically, I suggest in conclusion that a 
particular professionalised, activist subjectivity has emerged within certain 
CSOs, defined here under a new ideal-type notion of the ‘critical technician’. 
 
Within political economy, law, and sociology, scholars have addressed different 
enquiries related to the links between social justice activism and trade politics. 
At a macro-level, some authors have explored ‘fair trade’ or ‘global justice’ 
social movements (Della Porta 2007; Raynolds, Murray, and Wilkinson 2007; 
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Lang 2011). Other researchers have traced how CSOs have gained access to 
particular policy mechanisms, such as through the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) or the European Union (EU) (Dür and Bièvre 2007; Hannah 2016). 
Further studies have explored the impact of CSO activism on specific trade-
related areas, including labour standards, investment, or intellectual property 
rules (Murphy 2010). Together, these contributions aid our understanding of 
the political contestability of trade regulation, but all tend to be weaker in two 
aspects. In one sense, there is a paucity of analysis on how struggles have 
played out behind the scenes in particular CSOs and within their social 
networks. In other words, evaluating the larger question of CSO conduct and 
effectiveness can only be adequately understood through combining an 
assessment of internal deliberation with external repercussions. Like other 
societal institutions, CSOs tend to project an image of coherence, purpose and 
control, even when their working environment may feature frequent disputes or 
cloudy objectives. In another respect, the coverage of CSO engagement with 
global trade policy often misses an historical appreciation for how advocacy 
politics change over time. As I will argue, since the 1980s, the power exercised 
by major CSOs in the trade policy space has been nurtured and tested in ways 
that were not necessarily predictable. Tracing this history is a worthy enquiry 
because it helps to reveal gradual processes of adaptation to dominant 
agendas and subjectivities in capitalism which may be missed if one remains 
preoccupied with current events. 
 
To excavate this empirical terrain, the paper develops a particular conceptual 
approach of relevance to IPS, one which is attentive to the relations between, 
on the one hand, forms of power and, on the other, professions and processes 
of professionalisation. The study of professionalism has been a long-standing 
concern in sociology (Parsons 1939; Goode 1969; Larson 1977; Abbott 1988; 
Freidson 2001). In recent decades, this foundational literature has offered a 
springboard for other researchers to examine ‘expert’ or ‘knowledge-based’ 
forms of governance (Gorman and Sandefur 2011). For instance, in 
international relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE), the 
literature on epistemic communities (Haas 1992, 2016; Cross 2013) helped to 
fashion an analytical framework for studying how expert networks form 
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‘authoritative claims to policy-relevant knowledge’ (Haas 1992: 3). Elsewhere, 
more recently, Didier Bigo (2011, 2016) has advanced the concept of 
‘transnational guilds of professionals’ to denote those circuits of public and 
private actors who reconfigure fields of power, operating in ways which contest 
conventional politics and common meanings of where agency is located (also 
see Sending 2015; in addition, Kennedy 2016). Understanding the mechanisms 
of professionalisation in transnational governance has been further deepened 
through Seabrooke and Henriksen (2017), a volume which charts how to plot 
and theorise the relations between types of organisations and practices of 
professionalism. The argument in this paper draws inspiration from these 
writings, but also seeks to advance a Bourdieusian-weighed analytical 
framework for explaining how the wider culture of professionalisation has now 
sedimented into many spaces beyond the classic concerns of (national and 
international) bureaucracies which are covered in these literatures. 
 
At the intersection between these two bodies of scholarship, there are some 
authors who have examined what I term the professionalisation of protest in the 
trade policy arena. Most notably, Kristen Hopewell has astutely argued that 
some major civil society groups interested in the governance of the WTO ‘have 
been drawn towards increasingly technocratic and neoliberal forms of 
advocacy’ (Hopewell 2015: 1151). She illustrates this through attention to the 
working practices of such actors, including a normative preference for trade 
liberalisation and the deployment of legal and economic analysis within 
research endeavors. Other studies have explored similar themes, including Erin 
Hannah’s notion of ‘embedded NGOs’ who ‘accept the basic tenets of free 
trade’, yet try to utilise existing policy ideas to empower marginalised actors 
(Hannah 2014: 459). One can also note the particular examination of 
intellectuals in the global political economy of trade and how such figures have 
sometimes been utilised by advocacy groups (Scott 2015; more generally on 
expertise, see Hannah, Scott, and Trommer 2016). While both Hopewell (2015) 
and Hannah (2014) examine how certain civil society groups leverage ‘policy-
relevant’, technical expertise, often in the service of marginalised countries in 
the WTO system, my chief starting point in this article is the very historical 
construction of such authority since the 1980s, a context which has been so far 
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underdeveloped.2 This article also makes a distinctive contribution through a 
detailed exploration around Oxfam’s trade campaigning history and, in addition, 
develops a mid-range conceptual tool designed to illuminate some of the wider 
behavioural tendencies of modern activism within professional settings. In the 
process, therefore, I suggest that the theoretical insights developed here go 
beyond the particular case of trade policy and have wider application. 
Ultimately, this paper therefore aims to contribute to larger discussions in IPS 
on democratic expression in the remaking of global politics, including the 
problem of how CSOs have tried to enlarge the scope for deliberation, 
contestability, and impact. 
 
The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, I contextualise the 
discussion on professionalisation through an engagement with theoretical 
issues, including an outline of the utility of the scientific capital framework. In 
the second section, I begin the examination of the case of Oxfam’s trade policy 
advocacy through the prism of scientific capital. In the shadow of the transition 
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the WTO system, 
set within the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, I explore how and 
why Oxfam tended to occupy a marginalised position in trade policy debates. 
In the third section, I turn to address a prominent Oxfam campaign around the 
turn of the century called Make Trade Fair. Within this period, the culture of 
professionalisation was maturing within the organisation, to the extent that 
Oxfam acquired greater recognition from authorised experts and bodies, but 
also notable criticism. Derived from this empirical enquiry, the final section 
offers a brief outline of the critical technician notion for better understanding 
what behavioural attributes are prized within this particular social space of 
‘reformist advocacy’. 
 
 
I. PROFESSIONALISATION, EXPERTISE, AND SCIENTIFIC CAPITAL 
 
                                                        
2 For instance, in Hannah’s (2014) account, she views her category of ‘embedded NGOs’ as largely 
emerging from the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development in 2002. My conceptualisation in 
this article adopts as a wider lens, both in respect to historical development and the contemporary 
spreading of professionalised standards of comportment among societal actors.  
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From classic studies within sociology to more recent analysis of knowledge-
based work, scholarship on professionalisation has tended to define the subject 
in relation to four major themes: (1) the production of expertise; (2) technical 
autonomy; (3) a normative orientation towards the service of others; and (4) 
high status, income and other rewards (Gorman and Sandefur 2011). This 
article features a particular focus on the first of these factors since, as it has 
often been remarked, the creation and social reproduction of expert knowledge 
is the sine qua non of professional activity. All persons that are named, or self-
identify as, experts seek the authority to engage with targeted audiences. To 
different degrees, they diagnose, infer, and treat problems of governance that 
are judged to be socially important (Abbott 1988). Within IPE, understanding 
the politics of policy expertise has been a reoccurring theme, as many 
constructivist-leaning authors have debated in respect to a range of empirical 
topics (McNamara 1999; Blyth 2002; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Best 2005, 
2014; Sinclair 2005; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010; Chwieroth 2010). 
Together, these studies help us to explain why and how particular theories, 
agendas, and modes of reasoning acquire a legitimised power and who 
benefits from such privileging, along with attention to how forms of social 
critique may contest and, in certain cases, reshape dominant policy 
orthodoxies.  
 
This paper builds upon such literature, but is also distinctive for charting how 
other entities in world politics – beyond the common focus on state agencies, 
international institutions, and corporate groups – learn how to acquire 
‘authentic’ practices associated with modern professionalism. Such forms of 
learning are, in part, shaped by whatever is intersubjectively valued as the most 
desirable forms of capital within particular social spaces, the historical struggles 
of which will tend to be informed by those agents who are more capable of 
reproducing the dominant culture. For instance, some researchers have argued 
how the growth of large CSOs has been accompanied by a ‘privatisation of 
politics’ (Hilton et al. 2013) or, in particular cases, a ‘corporatization of activism’ 
(Jordan and Maloney 1997; Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014). Such literature has 
been alert to the implicit or explicit importing of managerial thinking into CSOs, 
including how ideas on efficiency, accountability, branding, and benchmarking 
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shape what counts as appropriate advocacy action (Roberts, Jones, and 
Fröhling 2005; Lewis 2007; Dar and Cooke 2008; Seabrooke and Wigan 2015). 
In short, my argument seeks to examine how civil society agents who have 
been historically marginalised in policy deliberations – relative to governments, 
firms, or lobby associations – have laboured to build the necessary forms of 
expertise to speak with authority and, thus, acquire the socio-political 
recognition of becoming an expert. When successful, these agents may, 
indeed, be considered ‘expert-activists’ (Seabrooke and Wigan 2015). While 
the influence of corporate power and ideology on major CSOs has certainly 
increased since the 1990s, in contrast to Dauvergne and LeBaron (2014), I view 
the nurturing of a professional culture as a wider trend of social comportment 
which cannot be easily captured under the label of ‘corporatization’ emanating 
from private sector actors. 
 
Inspired by work on professionalisation within IPS, this paper agrees with 
Sending’s (2015) starting proposition that the ‘question of whether and how 
expert groups may shape policy is subordinate to the question of the type and 
contents of knowledge that prevail as authoritative in shaping debates about 
what should be governed, how, and why’ (Sending 2015: 8). In the context of 
international trade policy, I explore, in the spirit of Dezalay and Garth’s (2002, 
2011) analysis of professional rivalries, the enduring significance of economic 
and legal expertise as disciplinary bodies inscribed in the struggle over the 
universal (also see Fourcade 2006, 2010; Dezalay and Madsen 2017; 
Seabrooke and Henriksen 2017). I am interested here in not only how CSOs 
may contest such knowledge, but also how their working practices and, at 
times, normative inclinations may align with similar thinking and conduct found 
in conventional bureaucratic agencies of authority, in the process forming part 
of a wider ‘transnational power elite’ (Kauppi and Madsen 2013, 2014). The 
argument also shares some affinity with Bigo’s (2016) concept of ‘transnational 
guilds’ of professionals: first, for the attention to how agents try to master 
whatever is judged to constitute the methods of their ‘artisanal craft’; and 
second, for how a sense of cross-border solidarity is stimulated through 
association with the ‘guild’ in question. Although the empirical discussion here 
does not map a trade policy-related transnational guild, the research is 
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motivated by a larger concern for understanding the ‘international political 
economy roots’ of such relations in the neoliberal period, including the 
‘entanglement between public and private agents who are bureaucrats on both 
sides’ (Bigo 2016: 412).   
 
To enrich the empirics, my argument makes use of a framework which is alert 
to the uneven relations between expertise and power: Bourdieu’s relatively 
underexplored notion of scientific capital (see partial exceptions in IPS by 
Bernhard 2011; Berling 2015). This concept was originally formulated in his 
sociology of science and the evaluation of what he calls the scientific field 
(Bourdieu 1975, 1991, 2004). In strict Bourdieu usage, scientific capital 
functions as a form of symbolic power in the wider politics of social recognition 
and legitimacy production.3 To explain the utility of scientific capital, three 
aspects can be highlighted. First, by associating ‘science’ with ‘capital’, it helps 
to foreground how the production of expertise is shaped by a panoply of power 
relations, ranging from explicit requirements to more subtle sleights of hand. 
While this core point is accepted by many, including IR constructivists (for 
instance, see Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Best 2014), Bourdieu suggests that 
one still needs to guard against any ‘irenic’ depiction of experts engaged in a 
so-called ‘perfect competition of ideas, a contest infallibly decided by the 
intrinsic strength of the true idea’ (Bourdieu 1975: 19). Instead, all references 
to ‘technical’ or, particularly in our current period, ‘global’ competence and 
reason bare the imprint of politics. Within the social construction of scientific 
capital, there are obviously gradations of politicisation in how policy-facing 
professionals work and perceive their actions; the definition of any ‘interest’ is, 
therefore, neither purely ‘political’ nor purely ‘intellectual’. Indeed, it is precisely 
because social agents feature multilayered and dynamic schemas – a habitus 
which can conflate and often confuse the particular with the universal – which 
makes the study of scientific capital a worthy enquiry. 
 
                                                        
3 To be clear, I am applying this concept as an abstracted reference to what is presumed to be objective, 
often positivist, principles of knowledge and argumentation, and not in the sense that the civil society 
representatives under study here are qualified natural scientists. 
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Second, Bourdieu includes a wide variety of objects and processes as being 
implicated in the uneven generation of scientific capital and the making of 
‘normal’ professional conduct. In one sense, as noted, this includes attention to 
disciplinary knowledge and how the earning of degrees, such as from 
institutions recognised as ‘prestigious’, offers a socially consecrated passport 
for the agent to enter into milieus where the scientific capital is valorised (for 
instance, see Chwieroth (2010) on the relationship between Ivy League 
universities and IMF staff recruitment). For CSO analysts who desire to shape 
the stakes of the trade policy game, a qualification in economics, law, or 
development studies represents an initial, objectified form of scientific capital. 
A Bourdieusian perspective is also analytically sensitive in another respect: that 
is, for observing how scientific capital is ‘marked by an elaborate apparatus of 
emblems and signs’ (Bourdieu 1975: 20). Distinctively in relation to the existing 
literature, I translate and extend this particular theme through examining what 
could be commonly called the presentational or campaigning aspects of 
modern CSO professionalism. The aim here is to explore how the cultivation of 
scientific capital proceeds not only through the command of orthodox policy 
expertise and, in particular, the use of quantifiable knowledge, but also via the 
reformulation of data into narratives, headline messages, and visual content. 
Indeed, mastering these latter skills is a crucial feature of how the activist 
appeals to multiple audiences, including the non-expert, in a reoccuring pattern 
which is similar to Seabrooke’s (2014) notion of ‘identity switching’. Thus, 
scientific capital can carry important effects – such as via popular emotional 
incitement and group mobilisation – even if the targeted audience has not 
understood, or actively engaged with, the precise empirical content of the 
argument in question. It can be debated if these effects, at a deeper level, are 
now reconfiguring what is socially judged to be a legitimate or persuasive 
policy-related argument.  
 
Third, the notion of scientific capital can also be used as a vehicle for exploring 
the differences between succession and subversion strategies in the struggle 
to accumulate professional authority. This aspect is particularly valuable for my 
empirical content which is focused on how ‘new entrants’ to the trade policy 
game have tried to contest the organisation and normative basis of international 
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commerce. For Bourdieu, new pretenders to a field can adopt a succession 
strategy, whereby they build relations with established experts, offer ‘limited 
innovations within authorised limits’, and await the likelihood of acquiring 
scientific profits of distinction. By contrast, a subversion strategy, premised on 
‘more costly and more hazardous investments’ of heterodox critique, will tend 
to increase risk, particularly if it involves problematising core principles. It 
follows, therefore, that ‘newcomers who refuse the beaten tracks cannot “beat 
the dominant at their own game” unless they make additional, strictly scientific 
investments from which they cannot expect high profits, at least in the short 
run, since the whole logic of the system is against them’ (Bourdieu 1975: 30; 
also see Bourdieu 1991). Here, I would like to develop this argument, but also 
suggest that shades of grey exist between succession and subversion 
methods, including circumstances where it may be unclear which is the most 
significant orientation. In addition, one may also witness a conservation 
strategy on the part of an actor who was subversive at an earlier stage in 
history. I argue that the tension between these main strategic tendencies of 
action stems from the social pressure on new entrants to acquire and sustain 
recognition while, at the same time, cultivating a political critique which remains 
‘comprehensible’ within the core of the field.  
 
Although the focus in this paper is on scientific capital as a form of power, I 
acknowledge that other species and structures of power shape outcomes in 
trade policy activism. The following analysis makes note of how, for instance, 
economic capital to fund extensive trade policy campaigns within a large CSO 
is obviously significant when compared to smaller entities with more limited 
budgets. In addition, the social capital derived from acquiring a durable network 
of connections and ties of appreciation – within governments, international 
bodies, domestic social groups, and the media – also informs the potential 
effectiveness of any CSO campaign. The relations between economic, social, 
and scientific capital would, indeed, constitute a richer examination, but one 
which would expand beyond the confines of the space here. Through 
foregrounding the struggle over scientific capital, my aim is to further dissect 
the relations between expertise and power in the making of modern 
professionalism. With these conceptual issues in mind, we can turn to the 
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empirical case on Oxfam within the social world of international trade policy 
activism. 
 
Within the two main empirical sections which follow, I draw upon primary and 
secondary data to examine the case of Oxfam’s trade policy advocacy through 
the conceptual category of scientific capital. The research is derived from three 
main sources: (1) interviews with 20 subjects, including past and present Oxfam 
representatives, independent consultants who have worked for CSOs, and 
WTO Secretariat representatives; (2) reports and internal communications 
extracted from the Oxfam Archives at the Bodleian Library, Oxford; and (3) 
secondary academic literature. The discussion explores how Oxfam steadily 
emerged as a voice in trade policy activism, noting in particular the research 
content and presentation techniques used to nurture forms of professional 
authority. To illuminate how the group struggled to adapt to the international 
trade policy game, I first plot the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. 
This phase highlights how Oxfam was experimenting with certain indicators of 
professional conduct yet, at the same time, did not generate much concrete 
impact on wider trade policy debates and rules. In section four, by way of 
comparison, I concentrate on a particular illustration drawn from the early 
2000s: the making of a major trade policy report and campaign. Within this 
discussion, I dissect some of the major features of scientific capital and how 
Oxfam struggled to carve out a recognisable space for protest and dialogue 
which continues today.  
 
 
II. THE STRUGGLE TO ENTER THE TRADE POLICY GAME 
 
In order to grasp the stakes and implications of this discussion, one needs some 
context on the larger professional population of trade policy experts. In the post-
WW2 period, in the shadow of the GATT as the major body of law informing the 
reconstruction of a Western-centred capitalism, the social world of trade 
experts took on an enclosed quality. The esoteric, at times impenetrably dry 
subject matter of trade – such as debating the finer points of tariff schedules or 
anti-dumping codes – often did not enhance the prospect of dialogue between 
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government departments, never mind broader public deliberation and critical 
academic scrutiny. The cultivation of such insularity led, in Robert Howse’s 
(2002: 98) words, to the making of a particular transnational ‘elite’ or ‘insider 
network’. Since the 1970s, one could suggest that the composition of this 
network has broadened, such as in response to the incorporation of new states 
and investment in diplomatic trade missions, while remaining relatively 
coherent in terms of disciplinary biases (economics and law), normative 
predilections (trade liberalisation as generally beneficial), and technocratic 
impulses (limits on accountability). Core experts within this elite would include: 
employees within the GATT/WTO system, delegates from influential 
governments, domestic trade officials with a remit in commercial agendas, 
other international institutions with a trade brief (such as the World Bank or 
OECD), along with policy-facing academics and private practitioners (Howse 
and Nicolaïdis 2008).4 Although it would be wrong to depict the agents in this 
universe as either completely homogenous in their visions or organised 
according to some calculated and codified plan, there is still a loose liberal 
ethos and practical ‘sense of the game’ regarding what problems of global trade 
merit analytical attention and how they should be treated. Unsurprisingly, once 
socialised into the space, solidarity tends to consolidate through a sense of 
collegiality, friendship, and various ‘self-referential’ cues, although this should 
not be taken to mean that personal rivalries are non-existent (Weiler 2001: 336; 
also see Xu and Weller 2004; Pauwelyn 2005; Marceau 2015). 
 
Whether this insider network constitutes a field in the Bourdieusian sense can 
be debated but, at the very least, it forms a distinctive social setting of experts 
who govern, to different degrees, a significant regulatory space of global 
capitalism. For newcomers in civil society groups who seek any kind of effective 
participation in this space, they confront a number of entry requirements and 
obstacles. In parallel, or sometimes even prior to, the problem of how to master 
relevant policy expertise and devise strategies for ‘selling’ alternative 
propositions to different audiences, new entrants, as relative outsiders, have 
                                                        
4 For an illustration of figures within this network, see the biographical data on 106 prominent persons 
associated with the history of the GATT/WTO system in VanGrasstek, C., The History and Future of the 
World Trade Organization (Geneva: WTO, 2013), 571-598. 
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often been preoccupied about transparency problems. In the context of the 
club-like GATT culture, with its aura of aristocratic-like discretion, trade 
diplomacy, in part a reflection of diplomatic conduct in general, has historically 
be shaped by secrecy or limits on the public disclosure of information (Curzon 
and Curzon 1973; Keohane and Nye 2001; for a review, see Lamp 2016). This 
legacy continued into the contemporary system of trade diplomacy including, 
but also beyond, the WTO arena.5 The recourse to informality in decision-
making and rule setting has also been a major grievance of many developing 
countries who largely, although not entirely, tended to lack the capacity of 
Western governments (Jawara and Kwa 2004; Jones 2009; Narlikar 2012). It 
follows, therefore, that one immediate and fundamental problem faced by 
CSOs – particularly in the context of the 1980s and 1990s which I trace below 
– was how to decipher the basic contours and direction of the trade policy 
agenda (including all the detail on mandates, negotiation texts, and lobbying 
interests within a wider labyrinth of politics).  
 
This context should not be taken to mean that the post-WW2 trading regime 
was hermetically sealed from social critique, including the voice of certain 
CSOs. The GATT agenda, along with the intellectual orthodoxy of trade theory, 
was problematised by a range of individuals and institutions which, in turn, 
would provide an epistemic foundation for the strengthening of CSO activism 
at the turn of the century. For instance, the establishment of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, led by Raúl 
Prebisch and Wladyslaw Malinowski, was explicit in scrutinising how injustices 
in the world economy were the product of rulemaking structures between rich 
and poor countries. In addition to its intellectual work as a critical knowledge 
producer, UNCTAD led the creation of the Group of 77 and succeeded in 
reforming trade rules to allow developing countries preferential access to 
developed countries markets (Tussie 1987; UNCTAD 2004; Taylor and Smith 
                                                        
5 For example, the early WTO continued the restrictive, GATT-era practice of withholding documents 
related to decision-making and negotiations. By 1996, encouraged by groups such as the Geneva-based 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), the WTO membership agreed to 
gradually de-restrict documents. This seemingly unremarkable decision of bureaucratic management 
would prove significant in allowing more light to be shed on WTO politics and thus, in turn, increase the 
potential for research-intensive, civil society actors to develop critiques of the organisation.  
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2007; Hannah and Scott 2017).6 From the early 1970s, UNCTAD was also the 
institutional hub for the promotion of the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO), an umbrella term for debating pervasive North-South inequities within 
economic policies, negotiation processes, historical structures, and systems of 
knowledge (Cox 1979; Murphy 1984). During this period of Third Worldism, the 
‘NIEO imaginary’ also served as a catalyst for CSOs, such as War on Want, 
who campaigned for a more just capitalist system via the narrative of a 
‘common humanity’ (O’Sullivan 2015). With these major aspects of the social 
history of international trade politics in mind, we can turn to the particular case 
of how Oxfam sought a more prominent voice.  
 
From the mid-1980s to the late-1990s, within Europe, North America and 
elsewhere, the inherent political content of international trade policy acquired a 
wider resonance. During this period, a number of CSOs had concerns 
regarding trade policy, but also viewed such problems as being intertwined with 
development, aid, and debt politics. It is worth noting that this holistic vision 
often tended to mirror the general policy orientation of UNCTAD, whose 
research outputs continued to be more favourably read by many CSO analysts. 
Examples of prominent networks of CSOs at this time include the European 
Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People (EUROSTEP) and the 
International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity (EURO-CIDSE). 
Such collectives began to mobilise over the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-94) 
of trade talks and worked primarily through the NGO-GATT Steering 
Committee. The UK was a key centre for CSOs who carved out a stake in trade 
policy, including activism by the Catholic Institute for International Relations 
(CIIR) and Christian Aid (Wilkinson 1996; Lang 2011). From 1994, with the 
signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
founding of the WTO, public debate over an expanding trade agenda became 
increasingly visible within many polities, such as the US, Canada, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. In the EU in particular, such interest generated 
                                                        
6 The major trade policy reform generated by UNCTAD was the establishment of the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) in 1970. By 1979, this policy innovation was incorporated by the GATT (via the 
Enabling Clause) to become a permanent legal resource. GSP schemes were subseqently introduced in 
many developed countries: by the mid-1990s, developing countries received trade preferences for their 
exports to developed countries amounting to approximately $80 billion per year (UNCTAD 2004). 
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a shift in how the trade-related CSOs were addressed, including an emphasis 
on ‘partnership’ initiatives led by the Commission (Meunier 2003; Hocking 
2004; Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007).  
 
Oxfam has always had a prominent position within this civil society landscape 
and, in some respects, could be viewed as an atypical case due to its size and 
international reach. Prior to 1995, a year when Oxfam International was formed 
as an overarching secretariat body, the group was comprised of 12 largely 
autonomous, nationally-focused affiliates (such as Oxfam GB, Oxfam America, 
and Oxfam India; internally referred to as ‘Oxfams’).7 These entities continue to 
have degrees of operational freedom within a confederation structure. In the 
UK, Oxfam GB has consistently been among the richest charities, registering 
an income of £51 million in 1984-85, £69 million in 1990-91, before reaching 
£187 million in 2000-01 (Black 1992; Oxfam Annual Report and Accounts 
2001). As illustrated in Figure 1, this income growth has steadily risen, 
surpassing £300 million by 2008-09. Figure 2 showcases the corresponding 
increase in staff recruitment in the group, including a doubling of Oxfam GB 
staff numbers from 1989 to 2009 (Hilton et al. 2012). From the mid-1980s to 
the millennium, most of Oxfam’s spending was devoted to conventional forms 
of development assistance in developing countries, notably its well known 
humanitarian relief and aid operations aimed at eliminating poverty and forms 
of injustice. Expenditure devoted to ‘advocacy’ – defined as activities around 
research, education, lobbying, and campaigning – was much less. According 
to one estimate, in 1984, Oxfam GB devoted 4.4 per cent of total expenditure 
to advocacy, a figure that rose to 6.7 per cent by 1996 (Anderson 2007). 
Nevertheless, in the wider picture, due to the overall increase in Oxfam’s 
income over this period, spending on advocacy-related work increased 
substantially and, in addition, was often larger than other comparable CSOs. 
 
When one turns to Oxfam’s relationship to trade policy, the second half of the 
1980s featured few publications specifically focused on trade issues. Instead, 
                                                        
7 As of 2017, there are 19 affiliates: Oxfam America, Oxfam Australia, Oxfam-in-Belgium, Oxfam Canada, 
Oxfam IBIS (Denmark), Oxfam France, Oxfam Germany, Oxfam GB, Oxfam Hong Kong, Oxfam India, 
Oxfam Intermón (Spain), Oxfam Ireland, Oxfam Italy, Oxfam Japan, Oxfam Mexico, Oxfam New Zealand, 
Oxfam Novib (Netherlands), Oxfam-Québec, and Oxfam South Africa.  
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as noted, trade policy was often embedded within a general conversation on 
aid and debt politics (particularly as related to IMF and World Bank structural 
adjustment policies). In the wake of the Cambodian and Ethiopian crises, under  
 
 
Figure 1 Voluntary and total income of Oxfam, 1958-2010 (adjusted 
for inflation, 2009). Source: Hilton et al. (2012): 184. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Number of staff working for Oxfam, 1969-2009. Source: 
Hilton et al. (2012): 185. 
 
 
the directorship of Frank Judd (1985-91), Oxfam GB began to make further 
investments in research capacity. Similar to contemporary activism, these 
efforts were targeted at Oxfam’s own supporters who, in turn, would help to 
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assist in fundraising. For instance, Belinda Coote’s (1987) book-length study 
on the sugar industry, including how EU overproduction negatively impacted 
developing country producers, represents the first detailed, Oxfam-produced 
critique on a particular commodity. In addition to other reports under the ‘Hungry 
for Change’ campaign, I would suggest that we see here the making of a basic 
template which would guide aspects of future research projects. Three issues 
are worth noting. First, the idea of an occasional overview report is established, 
one that synthesizes together problems, before offering policy 
recommendations (Twose 1984; Clark 1986). Second, these publications 
experiment with different forms of evidence in an effort to stir and persuade the 
reader, including drawing upon Oxfam’s own field officers, data from 
international institutions, and other literature. Descriptive statistics is often given 
a prominent position along with case study boxes and photos. Third, 
memorable one-liners are penned in an effort to encapsulate some form of 
injustice, such as: ‘For every £1 the world contributed to famine relief in Africa 
in 1985, the West took back £2 in debt repayment’ (Black 1992: 269). 
 
However, by the early 1990s, despite this activity, some individuals were 
registering a sense of unease at a disconnect between the expanding trade 
policy agenda within the Uruguay Round and the response of Oxfam and other 
CSOs (Wilkinson 1996; see also Clark 1992; Edwards 1993). In this context, 
the particular contribution of Kevin Watkins needs to be highlighted as being 
significant.8 In 1991, Watkins joined Oxfam from CIIR, rising from a Policy 
Analyst to Head of Research. Watkins argued that activists had failed to 
adequately monitor and critique the distribution consequences of existing trade 
rules and the new GATT programme. As he expressed it: ‘When I joined Oxfam, 
NGO advocacy on trade was very limited both in terms of its ambition and 
approach’.9 Watkins was concerned that CSO trade analysis tended to have a 
predominate focus around terms of trade in agriculture and OECD surpluses 
which, while being important, overlooked the expanding GATT agenda around 
                                                        
8 In terms of educational background, Watkins was awarded a BA in Politics and Social Science from 
Durham University in 1974. In 1986, he earned a DPhil from the University of Oxford for a thesis titled: 
‘India: Colonialism, Nationalism and Perceptions of Development’. 
9 Kevin Watkins, former Head of Research, Oxford International, interview with the author, Oxford, June 
13, 2011. 
 18 
textiles, services, intellectual property, and investment (for instance, see 
Watkins 1992; and Coote 1992). This point has been noted by other Oxfam 
representatives who suggest that the GATT was often treated as an ‘obscure’ 
regime of law, one which was difficult to penetrate.10 While CSOs offered 
studies around some agricultural commodities, they did not have the capacity 
to evaluate the effects of the GATT agenda as an integrated package, leading 
to arguments that were often dismissed by officials as being ‘overly-simplistic’ 
or even ‘Luddite’ (on relations with the European Commission, see Wilkinson 
1996).11 Importantly, at a normative level, Watkins was against ‘anti-trade’ or 
‘anti-markets’ reasoning which was heard within some quarters of Oxfam (a 
legacy of the attraction for some of dependency theory and Latin American 
structuralist economics). Instead, he suggested that ‘it was possible, within 
certain limits, if you could work the system effectively, to secure small gains in 
market access for developing countries’. It was this more moderate, ‘reformist’ 
disposition, one that called for dissecting the trade orthodoxy, before searching 
for new policy openings, which would characterise Oxfam’s subsequent 
research trajectory (see Watkins 1995a, 1995b; LeQuesne 1996). As he 
expressed it, the aim was to ‘shift trade debates from abstract discussions 
about prices to something that was really about political decisions and 
negotiations’.12 
 
By returning to the framework on scientific capital, we can provide some 
enhanced perspective on this period. One aspect concerns how Oxfam, along 
with other trade-facing CSOs, arguably did not possess the ‘authentic’ scientific 
capital to not only shape the GATT agenda, but simply to monitor policy 
developments within a system where capitalist elites were searching for new 
                                                        
10 Duncan Green, former Head of Research, Oxfam International, interview with the author, London, 27 
May 2011; and Emily Jones, former Policy Advisor, Oxfam International, interview with the author, Oxford, 
26 October 2011.  
11 By comparison, activism on trade policy within US and Canadian-based CSO networks was arguably 
more mature, reflecting interest in the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and the negotiations for the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For instance, from the late 1980s, at the Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), Mark Ritchie was influential in alerting others to the emerging GATT 
agenda. At Public Citizen, Lori Wallach was important in tracking the GATT agenda from Geneva and 
forming alliances with other activists, leading in 1992 to the establishment of the Citizen’s Trade Campaign 
(CTC) (Aaronson 2001).  
12 Watkins, interview with the author. 
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forms of commodity value.13 In one sense, this degree of ignorance of the GATT 
agenda was caused by its aforementioned club-like environment, a social world 
which was difficult to enter, scrutinise, and communicate to other outsiders. 
Such repercussions bring to mind Bourdieu’s (1975) point that the internal 
valorisation and refinement of scientific capital within a field, including all the 
competition between authorised experts for domination, tends over time to raise 
the entry requirements for new pretenders. By the mid-1990s, this problem 
became particularly acute due to a significant thickening of the legal-normative 
structure of rulemaking and culture in the new WTO (Howse 2002; Pauwelyn 
2005). It follows, therefore, that higher barriers to entry will often reduce the 
prospect of agents nurturing more profound subversion strategies and increase 
the likelihood of contests remaining within the boundaries of the orthodoxy; that 
is, not significantly disturbing the major principles of legitimacy in the field. This 
tension ultimately reflects how Oxfam is caught in a struggle to acquire 
professional legitimacy with two different types of audience: (1) the relatively 
secluded space of bureaucratic trade formulation (which was often resistant to 
any engagement with civil society) and, at the same time; (2) a diverse external 
world of constituents, critics, and media (some of whom may not adequately 
grasp the precise constitution of the scientific capital under deliberation and, as 
a course of strategy, demand more ‘radical action’). In the language of social 
activism, this central point has been summarised by Edwards (1993: 169-170): 
 
‘NGOs face a real dilemma here: on the one hand, if they try to 
“speak the same language” as the targets of their advocacy 
and go about their work quietly and constructively, they risk 
being co-opted or generating a superficial response, there 
being no wider pressures for more fundamental change. On the 
other hand, if NGOs opt for a more radical path, they risk being 
marginalised, because their recommendations are so far 
                                                        
13 In the context of the Uruguay Round, the US, Japan, and the EU were focused on highly prized sectors 
and issues, such as services trade, financial investment, and intellectual property rules. Encouraged by 
leading corporate lobby associations within these sectors, trade policy began to move ‘beyond the border’ 
to penetrate domestic regulations in more profound ways. For studies on these issues, see Drake and 
Nicolaïdis (1992), and Sell (2003). 
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outside the intellectual and ideological framework of the 
prevailing orthodoxy that they are simply ignored’. 
 
This is, of course, an old historical problem, one that is often cast as between 
reformist versus revolutionary modes of advocacy. I would suggest that the 
gradual shift towards enhanced professionalisation within Oxfam around the 
turn of the century can be interpreted as an effort to negotiate – although never 
entirely reconcile – this tension between ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’ strategies in 
the politics of advocacy. As I will explain in the next section, this work has 
consisted of nurturing three sets of skills. First, in order to gain recognition in a 
social space dominated by orthodox experts, Oxfam has learnt how to 
demonstrate command of major agendas and techniques of scientific capital 
prized in the trade policy world. Second, to distinguish its brand of social 
critique, with a view to consolidating its position in the arguing universe, this 
research labour has become focused on isolating discrepancies, or indeed 
potential contradictions, between an idealised model of trade (such as found in 
neoclassical theory or in the rhetoric of trade bureaucracies) and concrete 
practices. Third, only following this critique can a further method be deployed: 
converting the newly minted scientific capital (in the form of reports and briefs) 
into digestible, communication packages for the wider world of observers and 
allies beyond the domain of established experts. To illustrate these tendencies 
in action, I advance forward to the early 2000s and focus on a particular 
illustration: the construction of an influential report, Rigged Rules and Double 
Standards (2002) which formed part of a major Oxfam campaign called ‘Make 
Trade Fair’. 
 
 
III. PLAYING THE TRADE POLICY GAME 
 
As with any actor aiming to shape the distributional effects of capitalism, Oxfam 
is positioned within larger epistemic and material structures which, in turn, 
constrain or enable the scope for action. Around the turn of the millennium, in 
the context of the ascendency of neoliberal norms and the specific efforts of the 
US and the EU to launch a new WTO round of negotiations, the trade policy 
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landscape included many contentious problems. For instance, the pressures 
experienced by many developing countries in the WTO became the subject of 
much controversy, related to both the process of negotiations and the 
substance of rules (Wade 2003; Jawara and Kwa 2004; also see Lang 2011). 
On the other hand, however, because the WTO had become a lightning rod for 
CSO and popular criticism – embracing labour unionists, environmentalists, 
and social justice campaigners – a window of opportunity had opened for 
cultivating a more sustained critique of the trade system and its inequities 
(McNally 2002; Smith and Johnston 2002; Steger and Wilson 2012).14 Within 
this broader alter-globalisation movement and, in particular, following the 
collapse of the Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference in 1999, Oxfam expanded 
its trade advocacy work. For example, in terms of the volume of outputs, from 
1999 to 2001, 26 publications focused on trade politics, including traditional 
topics such as agriculture, but also concerns related to the WTO’s institutional 
design, intellectual property rules, and gender-related questions. By contrast, 
over the entire period from 1980 to 1998, 19 publications featured explicit trade 
discussions. 
 
From early 2000, Oxfam began planning a more ambitious international trade 
campaign which would be launched in the first half of 2002. Key people involved 
in these discussions included Phil Twyford, Director for Advocacy for Oxfam 
International based in Washington DC; Justin Forsyth, Campaign and Policy 
Director; Phil Bloomer, Head of Advocacy and Public Policy; Penny Fowler, 
Trade Policy Adviser, and Kevin Watkins, still Head of Research.15 The 
production of a major report on trade policy was viewed as central to the 
potential effectiveness of the campaign. In one early draft strategy, it argues 
that the publication should be viewed as ‘not just a research exercise, but as 
                                                        
14 Other domestic and international political opportunities also helped to create the conditions for a more 
favourable dialogue between trade and development policy which, in turn, was exploited by Oxfam. A 
number of prominent policymakers, as well as international bodies (such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations and the South Centre), were increasingly calling for ‘more 
development’ in the WTO system. For instance, the Brazilian Ambassador, Celso Amorim, often argued 
that the system suffered from a ‘development deficit’. In the UK, the Labour government devoted more 
financial and political resources to development policy. For example, Clare Short, the UK Secretary of 
State for International Development (1997-2003), was perhaps the first official to attach the term 
‘development’ to the envisaged ‘new round’ of trade talks (which would be launched in Doha in 2001).  
15 These individuals only represent the core coordinators operating through a new Oxfam International 
Trade Campaign Working Group. By late 2001, in relation to Oxfam GB operations alone, there was a 
team of around 25 members focused on trade issues.  
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an opportunity to develop a dynamic process of dialogue with country 
programmes and partners, allies, and international coalitions’. There was a call 
to ‘elaborate a broad consensus position on trade’, one which argues that the 
potential benefits for developing countries are being lost due to ‘inappropriate 
trade rules [and] double standards’. What it claimed was needed, instead, are 
‘markets which work for the poor’. In turn, the draft proposed that this larger 
argument could be prosecuted through a ‘strong critique’ of existing theories on 
the links between trade, growth, and equity; as well as examining focused 
topics, such as around intellectual property rights and the impacts of agricultural 
dumping. Overall, it suggested that that ‘[w]e need to develop a stronger and 
more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between trade and poverty; 
and we need to develop a comparative advantage in capturing the human 
dimensions of trading activity’.16 On wider campaigning and messaging, there 
was a particular debate on the different ways to mobilise policy and public 
interest, including how and when to keep communications ‘complex’ or 
‘simple’.17  
 
In April 2002, Oxfam launched Rigged Rules and Double Standards as part of 
its larger Make Trade Fair campaign. Kevin Watkins wrote the report, with the 
exception of one chapter penned by Penny Fowler.18 In the acknowledgements, 
12 individuals are given special credit for their contribution. On background 
studies that were commissioned or incorporated into the research, recognition 
is given to a further 69 individuals and entities. Amartya Sen, Honorary 
President of Oxfam, added a foreword. Running to over 270 pages, and 
organised around nine chapters, it sets out a case that global trade relations 
magnify inequalities and contribute to poverty. It posits that the debate on trade 
policy is ‘dominated by ritualistic exchanges’ between two ‘fundamentalist 
camps’: ‘globaphiles’ who argue that ‘globalisation works for the poor’ and 
‘globaphobes’ who suggest that ‘trade is inherently bad for the poor’. The report 
                                                        
16 ‘International Trade Campaign: Concept Paper for Research and Report’, attached to email 
communication from Kevin Watkins, ‘OI Trade Campaign’, sent November 7, 2000. Oxfam Archives, 
Oxford University, Bodleian Library, Special Collections (MS. Oxfam PRG/8/3/2/11). 
17 ‘Trade Campaign Strategy’, Draft Version May 16, 2000. Oxfam Archives, Oxford University, Bodleian 
Library, Special Collections (MS. Oxfam PRG/8/3/2/11). 
18 Penny Fowler holds a BSc in Economics and Politics from the University of Bristol and an MSc 
Economics for Development from the University of Oxford. 
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argues that both orientations ‘fly in the face of the evidence – and neither offers 
any hope of the future’ (Oxfam International 2002: 7, 22). Through this framing, 
Rigged Rules and Double Standards (2002) tries to chart a middle ground: on 
the one hand, using examples such as Vietnam and Uganda, it argues that 
export success plays a role in poverty reduction and, therefore, developing 
countries should have enhanced market access opportunities to export their 
goods to developed countries (chapters 1 and 2). On the other hand, however, 
using evidence from World Bank and IMF conditionality agreements, it argues 
that rapid import liberalisation has often been detrimental to poverty reduction, 
citing China as a country which gradually liberalised. The theme of ‘double 
standards’ between a richer North and a poorer South is examined with many 
illustrations, including the impact of agricultural regulations in developed 
countries, intellectual property rules, and the behaviour of some transnational 
corporations (chapters 4, 7 and 8). 
 
In order to better understand the composition and social reactions of Rigged 
Rules and Double Standards (2002), as a example of Oxfam’s wider 
professionalisation, we can return to conceptualise the strategies and objects 
of scientific capital. Here, I would like to elaborate upon Bourdieu’s theorising 
to consider three dimensions of scientific capital in this case. The first 
dimension would be the academic qualifications of the Oxfam analyst. As an 
‘admission ticket’ to the social space of trade policy deliberation, the degree 
certificate, notably in economics or development studies, confers upon the 
analyst a distilled, legally sanctioned form of recognition. While essential for 
acquiring a position in the group and demonstrating foundational expertise, 
policy impact can only be potentially realised when the analyst cultivates 
another dimension of scientific capital: the production of new knowledge. Within 
the campaign and research outputs for Make Trade Fair, signifying the ability 
to absorb and synthesis large literatures – including, notably, sources from the 
World Bank, OECD, and mainstream economics – was a key way in which 
Oxfam tried to earn the label of ‘serious NGO’ in the wider world of experts.19 
                                                        
19 At the WTO Secretariat and in diplomatic trade circles, the term ‘serious’ has been invoked as a loose 
label for those civil society groups who are perceived to be ‘constructive’ in some way to the trade system, 
such as producing ‘substantive research’, although the identification of ‘non-serious’ groups is often not 
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Rigged Rules and Double Standards (2002) is furnished with many supporting 
graphs and figures, in the process appealing to the deeper ‘trust in numbers’ 
and the prestige associated with quantification (Porter 1995). Overall, as noted, 
it makes a significant normative commitment that trade liberalisation can be a 
‘powerful motor for the reduction of poverty’, but that this promise is not being 
adequately fulfilled (Oxfam International 2002: 5). As Hopewell (2015) has 
suggested, this stance could be read as Oxfam embracing arguments which 
carry a ‘neoliberal’ imprint and not, by contrast, calling for a rejection of the 
WTO regime (a demand seen in other groups, such as the Vía Campesina 
movement or Greenpeace in the late-1990s) (Ilcan and Lacey 2006).  
 
As a type of recognition, scientific capital is acquired through mastering the 
knowledge of the existing orthodoxy, yet social critique, and thus potential 
strategies of subversion, can only be cultivated through isolating and teasing 
out the vulnerabilities contained within the orthodoxy. To borrow from Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2006), such activity tends to probe the tensions, ambiguities, 
and potential contradictions which exist between the depictions of orthodoxy 
and how it is materially lived and experienced. In other words, the Oxfam 
research analyst seeks ways that will put the orthodoxy under greater scrutiny; 
sometimes to ‘tighten up’ the empirical rigour of certain causal relations, at other 
times, to more forcefully destablise so-called ‘myths’ or larger narratives. As 
one Oxfam representative expressed it, ‘there is often an effort to reverse 
engineer the status quo within these research projects, that is, to look at 
evidence on the ground as a way to question the presumption that free trade is 
inherently good’.20 This subversion strategy can also take the form of mimicking 
analytical models and methods used by conventional experts, such as a Trade 
Liberalisation Indicator used to dispute trade openness studies (chapter 5) or a 
Double Standards Index used to highlight forms of protectionism practiced by 
the US, EU, Canada, and Japan (chapter 4) (Oxfam International 2002). In 
short, all this research aims to stir a sense of moral indignation fueled by two 
major claims: (1) that trade rules are causing social suffering which could be 
                                                        
specified. Bernard Kuiten, Head of External Relations, World Trade Organization, interview with the 
author, February 16, 2016. Also see Hopewell (2015). 
20 Oxfam Policy Advisor, interview with the author, Oxford, March 12, 2012.   
 25 
undone; and (2) that certain representations in political and expert discourse 
are inauthentic and, thus, critique is needed, in the spirit of Marx, to expose a 
distinction between truth and illusion. 
 
A third dimension of scientific capital would involve analysing how this 
foundational expertise is now complemented by a range of presentational and 
branding tactics which, in turn, often help to reinforce the authority of the original 
research. These methods are primarily part of playing the ‘outsider’ game: that 
is, seizing the attention of relevant media to galvanise public sympathy. This 
can be seen in how the ambition to ‘humanise’ trade in campaigning literature 
frequenting incorporates quotes from ‘real people’, such as farmers and 
labourers in developing countries who are interviewed by local Oxfam staff. As 
elements within the text, they sometimes exist in an ambiguous relationship 
with the related analysis: either as enlightening the ‘sterilised’ social scientific 
knowledge with a human voice or, in other contexts, seeming to stand apart as 
some ‘authentic’ source of revelation. Elsewhere, the appeal to so-called ‘killer 
facts and graphics’ is particularly important as a way to quickly communicate a 
sense of injustice to journalists, targeted officials, and other constituents. For 
instance, in the Make Trade Fair campaign, the most frequently heard Oxfam-
composed ‘killer fact’ was the following: ‘Every EU cow receives over $2 per 
day in support and subsidies, more than the income of half the world’s people’. 
As noted, this particular tactic has been used since at least the 1980s, but by 
the early 2000s it was further expanded, refined, and promoted (see Green 
2012 for detail on the technique; and Green and Bloomer 2011). Finally, with 
the lowering of technology costs and the turn to a more visual, screen-based 
culture, the campaign was accompanied by a raft of promotional images, 
materials, and websites which helped to ‘keep the brand on message’. Within 
this activity, the involvement of celebrities, such as Colin Firth and Michael 
Stipe, helped to attract attention and enhance a media dialogue (more broadly 
on such trends, see Dogra 2012). 
 
When one turns to evaluate the wider impact and effectiveness of Rigged Rules 
and Double Standards (2002), there were a range of immediate responses. In 
one sense, within the media, the report was favourably received, with Oxfam 
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internally recording all publicity, along with privately received comments.21 
Strong forms of support quickly arrived from other leading CSOs, such as 
Christian Aid and CAFOD. Within the WTO talks, the publication was seized 
upon by countries within the Cairns Group, a coalition of countries with strong 
agricultural exporting interests (a result which was commended in one internal 
Oxfam email exchange).22 A number of developing countries who historically 
contested rules on OECD agricultural subsidies, such as Brazil, also praised 
the report, along with an emerging group of West African cotton-producing 
states (who would be the subject of a related Oxfam campaign from 2003). In 
the most detailed engagement from a single policy actor, the European 
Commission issued a 32-page response in which it congratulated the report for 
being ‘substantive’ and ‘well-researched’, although criticised the claims that the 
EU was the most protectionist major trading power (European Commission 
2002). As the Head of External Relations at the WTO expressed it when 
reflecting upon this period: ‘People in the WTO stood up and took notice of this 
report. Members read it. Oxfam was viewed as being a mainstream NGO. I 
think that it altered the debate because, in essence, it broadly respected the 
system and its disciplines before arguing for change. In my view, it is still a 
textbook example or education of how research-based advocacy can actually 
make a difference’.23 
 
At the same time, however, the report also generated considerable criticism 
from other CSOs who argued that Oxfam had placed too much focus on market 
access to richer countries, an emphasis which appeared to align with the 
reasoning of conventional trade experts. For instance, Walden Bello, Executive 
Director for Focus on the Global South, suggested that the framing between 
                                                        
21 This process of documenting feedback on the campaign can, indeed, be viewed as another aspect of 
the culture of professionalisation with Oxfam. It represents the development of a kind of embryonic 
managerialism within the group, a trend that would become more pronounced by the late 2000s. 
22 Mark Fried, ‘Agriculture and Trade Meeting in Ottawa’, email communication, sent May 6, 2002. Oxfam 
Archives, Oxford University, Bodleian Library, Special Collections (MS. Oxfam PRG/8/3/2/11). Within this 
email, it includes the following remarks on a meeting attended by Fried which included representatives 
from the Cairns Group: ‘When I made my presence know, I was deluged with requests for the report, and 
the heavy hitters sought me out to congratulate Oxfam for taking the globalization debate to the level of 
specific policy changes. I gather we have made ourselves heard at that level. Though it seems they hear 
what they want to hear. NGO allies heard only “market access”; this group heard only “end to subsidies”’. 
Established in 1986, the Cairns Group is a diverse coalition of 20 major agricultural exporting countries. 
Prominent members include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. 
23 Bernard Kuiten, Head of External Relations, World Trade Organization, Geneva, interview with the 
author, February 16, 2016. 
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‘globaphiles’ versus ‘globaphobes’ was a caricature, a distinction which risked 
creating divisions among the larger alter-globalisation movement. In Bello’s 
mind, Oxfam needed to adopt a long-term, aggressive strategy of ‘derailing’ the 
WTO as an engine of corporate-led capitalism, rather than searching for 
discrepancies within existing rules as part of a limited, ‘winnable’ campaign 
(Bello 2002). Patrick Bond, co-director for Food First, argued that the report 
was emblematic of how Oxfam had gradually drifted towards an ‘insiderist 
strategy’ on policy, one which tended to undermine the approach to ‘food 
sovereignty’ promoted by many other groups (Bond 2002). A similar critique 
was also made by the influential environmental activist Vandana Shiva who 
suggested that Oxfam had made a ‘failed attempt to mix two paradigms – one 
which gives precedence to people’s democracy, another which gives 
precedence to trade, commerce, markets’. The result was a ‘schizophrenic 
analysis’ as the group tried to position itself, through a method of political 
triangulation, as being a ‘moderate’ opinion on trade policy analysis (Shiva 
2002). It is also worth noting that some of these points were also expressed 
within Oxfam. For example, in the American and Belgium affiliates, some voices 
argued against not only the dichotomy between ‘globaphiles’ and 
‘globaphobes’, but also how part of the promotion of the campaign was 
operating within elite networks of power (such as targeting officials at the 
WTO).24  
 
It is this very contestation around Oxfam’s intellectual strategy on trade policy 
which brings to the surface certain tensions and anxieties stemming from the 
dynamics of professionalisation. On the one hand, in the shadow of its earlier, 
limited policy impact, I have argued that the group, led by particular 
entrepreneurs, sought to strengthen valued forms of scientific capital, resulting 
in an enhanced degree of political recognition around the turn of the century. 
On the other hand, however, this move towards professionalisation – which 
pivoted around a mild acceptance of the prevailing trade orthodoxy and some 
                                                        
24 Email communication from Xavier Declercq, Advocacy Director, Oxfam-Solidarity, ‘FW: Meeting with 
Nicolla Bullard (Focus) on Trade Campaign’, April 30th, 2002, Oxfam Archives, Oxford University, Bodleian 
Library, Special Collections (MS. Oxfam MS. Oxfam PRG/8/3/2/12). For an example of discord with Oxfam 
America, Severina Rivera, a senior trade analyst within the affiliate, resigning in protest at how the Make 
Trade Fair campaign was emphasising market access as part of its arguments. See Little, M., ‘Oxfam Fair 
Trade Policy Hit as US Adviser Quits’, Third Sector, May 15, 2002.  
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of its justificatory methods – also provoked criticism that Oxfam had ‘lost’ a 
sense of its critical calling. Some authors have suggested that such shifts can 
be cast in terms of how CSOs may be ‘incorporated into a neoliberal model of 
civil society’ (Kamat 2004: 155; also see earlier debates summarised by Dichter 
1989; as well as Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014; Hopewell 2015). While this 
depiction may give us a basic anchor within late capitalism, my argument is that 
a more subtle reading of activist subjectivity is needed, whereby the dance 
between power and principles of social justice can be represented through a 
new ideal-type category, labelled here as the ‘critical technician’. In other 
words, while the term neoliberalism offers a ‘descriptive shell’ for analysis 
(Venugopal 2015: 182), it also suffers under the burden of being tied to a vast 
galaxy of objects and processes. Here, in conclusion, I sketch out features of 
this concept of the critical technician and suggest its relevance for refreshing 
the larger study of the politics of professionalisation and expertise within IPS.  
 
 
IV. A NEW CONCEPT OF ‘REFORMIST’ ACTIVISM: THE CRITICAL TECHNICIAN 
 
Across many social fields, through the labour of dominant cultural producers, 
the recognised orthodoxy works to demarcate the boundaries of the ‘politically 
possible’ and, within this arduous activity, often tends to struggle with ‘deviant 
beliefs’ in order to better manage the reproduction of the orthodoxy (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967; Bourdieu 1977). The strength of any orthodoxy – at times a 
defining feature – centres on how it reconfigures itself against other potential 
orthodoxies, opinions that are positioned as heterodox by virtue of having a 
marginalised status (Berlinerblau 2001). Within the wide spectrum of potential 
heterodox protest actions, my concern in this article has been focused on those 
strategies which play with a selective appropriation, critique, and distortion of 
practices defined by the larger orthodoxy, rather than an outright rejection of 
the mainstream. Through this positioning, the heterodox voice tries to be 
‘communicable’ to the orthodoxy and may appear, via many arguments, to be 
‘making political sense’ (when defined in relation whatever is judged to be 
conventional or ‘best practice’). At the same time, such agents also try to retain 
a degree of autonomy from dominant powers – ideologically, financially, 
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socially, spatially – although how this distance is produced and evaluated is 
often contested. Rather than always adopting the larger concepts of CSO (or 
NGO) – categories that encompass an extraordinary plethora of entities and 
interests, both progressive and regressive – I would suggest here that the 
notion of the critical technician offers a more precise vehicle for exploring 
dispositional tendencies found within this class of professionalised civil society 
agents. In this regard, beyond the case of Oxfam, I am also thinking here of 
how other groups, such as Amnesty International, Save the Children, or 
Transparency International, will likely contain figures who fit within the mould of 
the critical technician (for instance, on Amnesty’s culture, see Hopgood 2006). 
 
My argument is that the critical technician tends to emerge under certain 
conditions. Through the degree certificate, such figures have already 
undergone a process of academic consecration which, in turn, will enable 
legitimate passage into organisations where scientific capital is prized. Within 
their professional life, the critical technician must demonstrate an energy to 
examine the shifting contents and fault lines within the latest policy orthodoxy, 
as well as, to the extent possible, the theoretical underpinnings and rulemaking 
legacies which have produced such orthodoxy. Due to the increased complexity 
of policy knowledge, such figures will often mimic established experts by 
steering towards specialised topics in order to acquire recognition, although the 
depth of this specialisation is always tempered by a need to ‘deliver expertise’ 
within resource-limited projects and political windows of opportunity. If a 
declared critical technician does not possess the capacity to X-ray the body of 
the policy orthodoxy, to understand the relations between its political joints, they 
will likely be questioned or ignored by authorised experts in the field (as with 
the phrases ‘not serious’, ‘no substantive research’ etc.). In other words, an 
agent who deviates too far from the orthodox ‘justificatory tests’ of the field will 
tend to be overlooked by those who occupy a privileged position (Boltanski and 
Chiapello 2006). This pressure on the critical technician to broadly conform 
may, over time, shape a cautious temperament, based upon the historical 
experience of learning how to test ‘politically viable’ policy propositions, as well 
as managing ties of acquaintance and dependence with authorised experts in 
established institutions.  
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At the same time, as documented in the Oxfam case, the critical technician can 
only arise if they engage in the articulation of heterodox critique and, thus, draw 
out and police a distinctive space of argument. At a normative level, in contrast 
to the presumed ‘politically neutral’ and ‘sterile’ calculations of orthodoxy, the 
critical technician will often appeal to alternative sources of authenticity, notably 
by reactivating the historical critique of capitalism as a system which 
undermines the realisation of social justice. This ethical appeal, in turn, opens 
the potential for investigating ‘missing’ topics, experiences, or categories of 
perception that are marginalised by orthodox policy knowledge. Yet because 
the critical technician has already prioritised their dance with the orthodox 
partner (combined with a latent anxiety of desiring invites to future dances), 
they will often face opposition from agents who are closer to the radical 
heterodox pole in the universe of argument (Bourdieu 1977). Such frictions can 
occur at many points and stages. Under such circumstances, the critical 
technician is confronted with accusations that their work still carries limited 
aspiration, with ideas that are too wedded to the mainstream; in other words, a 
dilution of some (previous) radical sensibility or spirit in order to occupy the 
‘middle ground’. However, in keeping with the dominant sociological tendencies 
of group-making, such tensions may subside where critical technicians 
coalesce together, within organisations or wider networks and, in the process, 
forge a collective professional identity which is removed from more radical 
alternatives. 
 
The category of the critical technician does share some affinity with Gramsci’s 
idea of the organic intellectual. First, the notion of the critical technician 
dovetails with Gramsci’s larger argument that the figure of the intellectual has 
undergone expansion and disaggregation under state-led capitalism, resulting 
in the emergence of rival organic intellectuals, representing different social 
groups, who intersect and compete with the stratum of traditional intellectuals. 
Second, similar to the concept of the organic intellectual, the critical technician 
is also a character who must be willing to participate in the practical struggle for 
hegemony, to be politically ‘directive’ as well as ‘specialized’ as Gramsci put it, 
in contrast to the traditional intellectual who often depict themselves as 
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autonomous and removed from explicit social responsibility. The critical 
technician is thus concerned with engaging with a wider audience beyond the 
intellectual elite; to be a ‘“permanent persuader” and not just a simple orator’ 
(Gramsci 1971: 10). Third, in a manner similar to Gramsci’s thinking, the critical 
technician, by virtue of their historical dominated position, will be concerned 
with dislodging the arbitrary construction of the common sense, rather than 
viewing it as an inevitable reality. In sum, as Stuart Hall has expressed it, ‘it is 
the job of the organic intellectual to know more than the traditional intellectuals 
do: really know, not just pretend to know… to know deeply and profoundly (Hall 
1996: 268). 
 
However, I also view the concept of the critical technician as probing other 
features within the political competition for contemporary expert authority. At 
one level, in contrast to classical Gramscian analysis, the category does not 
presume a particular class-bound foundation of selfawareness and, in 
particular, certainly does not automatically imply working class or socialist party 
origins, nor any kind of general revolutionary zeal. Indeed, compared to 
Gramsci, the politics and working methods of certain critical technicians can 
often appear rather tame, quiet and, therefore, in keeping with the label of 
‘reformism’. Elsewhere, informed by the empirical discussion in this article, 
whereas Gramsci allows conceptual space for the organic intellectual to pursue 
a variety of practices, the concept of the critical technician is designed to 
highlight how the struggle to mobilise contemporary scientific capital now 
embraces some distinctive representation strategies (such as the use of new 
media, images, and branding). In other words, the development of an ‘abstract 
mathematical spirit’ (Gramsci 1971: 10) is still a necessary core within the 
modern critical technician, but has now been complimented by communication 
strategies which are, in turn, reflective of an advanced cultural capitalism which 
celebrates represenation and the circulation of symbolic goods and services 
(Bourdieu 1984, 2005).25 
 
                                                        
25 A wider comparison between Gramsci and Bourdieu is arguably overdue, including on the question of 
intellectuals. Bourdieu was often coy and overly dismissive about Gramsci’s sophisticated Marxism and 
where precisely he positioned himself in relation to the author of the Prison Notebooks. For the better 
comparative analysis, see Buraway (2012), and Swartz (2013). 
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In sum, this article has sought to advance different arguments of relevance for 
IPS scholarship. On conceptual innovations, I have explicated the utility of 
Bourdieu’s notion of scientific capital for grasping the relations between 
expertise and power within cultures of professionalisation, a framework which 
has received comparatively little attention in IPS debates. My aim has been to 
apply scientific capital to not only classic empirical objects studied by Bourdieu, 
notably the struggle to construct authorised languages, but also to reveal how 
such capital is distilled into items of popular consumption. Through the 
empirical investigation into Oxfam, I have explained how a professionalised 
activist subjectivity has became increasingly normalised. The concept of the 
critical technician is offered as a way to dissect the working practices of policy-
facing agents who have otherwise struggled to acquire status within established 
circuits of powers. For IPS, I would suggest that the dispositional attributes of 
the critical technician are found in many other organisations and policy fields 
beyond the Oxfam example, such as human rights or environmental politics. 
Further research could explore how the conduct of such players has involved 
practicing a range of skills in order to acquire and sustain authority, such as 
aptitudes of discretion and deference, or new qualities of managerialism. A final 
contribution of this article would involve encouraging further connections at the 
nexus between IPS and IPE. Both fields have individually dissected global 
political processes, but it is only through a richer intellectual cross-pollination 
and dialogue that we can attend to the multi-faceted dimensions of capitalism 
and its influence on international relations. 
 
 
 
 33 
REFERENCES 
 
Aaronson, S. A., Taking Trade to the Streets: The Lost History of Public Efforts to 
Shape Globalization (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001). 
Abbott, A., The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
Abdelal, R., Blyth, M., and Parsons, C. (eds), Constructing the International Economy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).  
Anderson, I., ‘Global Action: International NGOs and Advocacy’, in Rugendyke, B. 
(ed.), NGOs as Advocates for Development in a Globalising World (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2007). 
Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. Rules for the World: International Organizations in 
Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).  
Bello, W., ‘The Oxfam Debate: From Controvesy to Common Strategy’, South Bulletin, 
36, 13-16. 
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor, 1967). 
Berling, T. V., The International Political Sociology of Security: Rethinking Theory and 
Practice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). 
Berlinerblau, J., ‘Toward a Sociology of Heresy, Orthodoxy, and Doxa’, History of 
Religions, 40 (2001), 4, 327-351. 
Bernhard, S., ‘Beyond Constructivism: The Political Sociology of an EU Policy Field’, 
International Political Sociology, 5 (2011), 4, 426-445. 
Best, J., The Limits of Transparency: Ambiguity and the History of International 
Finance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
Best, J., Governing Failure: Provisional Expertise and the Transformation of Global 
Development Finance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
Bigo D., ‘Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of 
Power’, International Political Sociology, 5 (2011), 3, 225-258. 
Bigo, D., ‘Sociology of Transnational Guilds’, International Political Sociology, 10 
(2016), 4, 398-416.  
Black, M., A Cause for Our Times: Oxfam The First 50 Years (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992). 
Blyth, M., Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
Boltanski, L. and Chaipello, E., The New Spirit of Capitalism (London: Verso, 2006). 
Bond, P., ‘Moderates Wilt But Radical South Africans Struggle On’, ZNet Daily 
Commentaries, April 17, 2002. 
Bourdieu, P., ‘The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the 
Progress of Reason’, Social Science Information, 14 (1975), 6, 19-47. 
Bourdieu, P., Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977). 
Bourdieu, P., Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (London: 
Routledge, 1984). 
Bourdieu, P., ‘The Forms of Capital’, in Richardson, J. G. (ed.), Handbook of Theory 
and Research for the Sociology of Education (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1986). 
Bourdieu, P., ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’, Sociological Theory, 7 (1989), 1, 
14-25. 
Bourdieu, P., ‘The Peculiar History of Scientific Reason’, Sociological Forum, 6 (1991), 
1, 3-26. 
Bourdieu, P., Science of Science and Reflexivity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
Bourdieu, P., The Social Structures of the Economy (Cambridge: Polity, 2005). 
 34 
Burawoy, M., ‘The Roots of Domination: Beyond Bourdieu and Gramsci’, Sociology, 
46 (2012), 2, 187-206. 
Chwieroth, J., Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).  
Clark, J., For Richer For Poorer: An Oxfam Report on Western Connections with World 
Hunger (Oxford: Oxfam, 1986). 
Clark, J., ‘Democratising Development: NGOs and the State’, Development in 
Practice, 2 (1992), 3, 151-162. 
Coote, B., The Hunger Crop: Poverty and the Sugar Industry (Oxford: Oxfam, 1987). 
Coote, B., The Trade Trap: Poverty and the Global Commodity Markets (Oxford: 
Oxfam, 1992). 
Cox, R. W., ‘Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on 
Some Recent Literature’, International Organization, 33 (1979), 2, 257-302. 
Cross, M. K. D., ‘Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later’, Review of 
International Studies, 39 (2013), 1, 137-160. 
Curzon, G. and Curzon, V., ‘GATT: Traders’ Club’ in Cox, R. W. and Jacobson (eds), 
The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organizations 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). 
Dar, S. and Cooke, B. (eds), The New Development Management: Critiquing the Dual 
Modernization (London: Zed Books, 2008). 
Dauvergne, P. and LeBaron, G., Protest Inc.: The Corporatization of Activism 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). 
Della Porta, D. (ed.), The Global Justice Movement: Cross National and Transnational 
Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2007). 
Dezalay, Y. and Garth, B. G., The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, 
Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
Dezalay, Y. and Garth, B. G., ‘Hegemonic Battles, Professional Rivalries, and the 
International Division of Labour in the Market for the Import and Export of State-
Governing Expertise’, International Political Sociology, 5 (2011), 3, 276-293. 
Dezalay, Y. and Madsen, M. R., ‘In the “Field” of Transnational Professionals: A Post-
Bourdieusian Approach to Transnational Legal Entrepreneurs’, in Seabrooke, 
L. and Henriksen, L. F. (eds), Professional Networks in Transnational 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
Dichter, T. W., ‘Development Management: Plain or Fancy? Sorting Out Some 
Muddles’, Public Administration and Development, 9 (1989), 4, 381-393. 
Dogra, N., Representations of Global Poverty: Aid, Development and International 
NGOs (London: I. B. Tauris 2012). 
Drake, W. and Nicolaïdis, K., ‘Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: “Trade in 
Services” and the Uruguay Round’, International Organization, 46 (1992), 1, 
37-100. 
Dür, A. and De Bièvre, D., ‘Inclusion without Influence? NGOs in European Trade 
Policy’, Journal of Public Policy, 27 (2007), 1, 79-101. 
European Commission, ‘Rigged Rules and Double Standards – Trade, Globalisation 
and the Fight Against Poverty’, Comments from the Commission, April 17, 
2002. 
Edwards, M., ‘“Does the Doormat Influence the Boot?”: Critical Thoughts on UK NGOs 
and International Advocacy’, Development in Practice, 3 (1993), 3, 163-175.  
Fourcade, M., ‘The Construction of a Global Profession: The Transnationalization of 
Economics’, American Journal of Sociology, 112 (2006), 1, 145-194. 
Fourcade, M., Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United 
States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010). 
Freidson, E., Professionalism: The Third Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2001). 
 35 
Gamble, A., Crisis Without End?: The Unravelling of Western Prosperity (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
Goode, W., ‘The Theoretical Limits of Professionalization’, in Etzioni, A. (ed.), The 
Semiprofessions and Their Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1969). 
Gorman, E. H. and Sandefur, R. L., ‘“Golden Age,” Quiescence, and Revival: How the 
Sociology of Professions Became the Study of Knowledge-Based Work’, Work 
and Occupations, 38 (2011), 3, 275-302. 
Gramsci, A., Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1971). 
Green, D., ‘Creating Killer Facts and Graphics’, Oxfam Research Guidelines (Oxford: 
Oxfam GB, 2012). 
Green, D. and Bloomer, P., ‘NGOs in Economic Diplomacy’ in Woolcock, S. and 
Bayne, N. (eds), The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and 
Negotiation in International Economic Relations (Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2011). 
Haas, P. M., ‘Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, 
International Organization, 46 (1992), 1, 1-35. 
Haas, P. M., Epistemic Communities, Constructivism, and International Environmental 
Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). 
Hall, S., ‘Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity’, in Morley, D. and 
Chen, K.-H. (eds), Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies (London: 
Routledge, 1996). 
Hannah, E., ‘The Quest for Accountable Governance: Embedded NGOs and Demand 
Driven Advocacy in the International Trade Regime’, Journal of World Trade, 
48 (2014), 3, 457-479. 
Hannah, E., NGOs and Global Trade: Non-State Voices in EU Trade Policymaking 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). 
Hannah, E. and Scott, J., ‘From Palais de Nations to Centre William Rappard: Raúl 
Prebisch and UNCTAD as Sources of Ideas in the GATT/WTO’, in Margulis, 
M. E. (ed.), The Global Political Economy of Raúl Prebisch (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2017). 
Hannah, E., Scott, J., and Trommer, S. (eds), Expert Knowledge in Global Trade 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). 
Hilton, M., McKay, J., Crowson, N., and Mouhot, J-F., The Politics of Expertise: How 
NGOs Shaped Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
Hilton, M., Crowson, N., Mouhot, J., McKay, J., A Historical Guide to NGOs in Britain: 
Charities, Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector Since 1945 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
Hocking, B., ‘Changing the Terms of Trade Policy Making: From the “Club” to the 
“Multistakeholder” Model’, World Trade Review, 3 (2004), 1, 3-26. 
Hopewell, K., ‘Multilateral Trade Governance as Social Field: Global Civil Society and 
the WTO’, Review of International Political Economy, 22 (2015), 6, 1128-1158. 
Hopgood, S., Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006). 
Howse, R., ‘From Politics to Technocracy – and Back Again: The Fate of the 
Multilateral Trading Regime’, The American Journal of International Law, 96 
(2002), 1, 94-117. 
Howse, R. and Nicolaïdis, K., ‘Democracy Without Sovereignty: The Global Vocation 
of Political Ethics’, in Broude, T. and Shany, Y. (eds), The Shifting Allocation of 
Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and 
Subsidiarity (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008). 
Ilcan, S. and Lacey, A., ‘Governing Through Empowerment: Oxfam’s Global Reform 
and Trade Campaigns’, Globalizations, 3 (2006), 2, 207-225. 
 36 
Jawara, F., and Kwa, A., Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of 
International Trade Negotiations/The Lessons of Cancún (London: Zed Books, 
2004). 
Jones, K., ‘Green Room Politics and the WTO’s Crisis of Representation’, Progress in 
Development Studies, 9 (2009), 4, 349-357. 
Jordan, A. G. and Maloney, W., The Protest Business: Mobilizing Campaigning Groups 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997). 
Kamat, S., ‘The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a 
Neoliberal Era’, Review of International Political Economy, 11 (2004), 1, 155-
176. 
Kennedy, D., A World Of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global 
Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S., ‘The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and 
Problems of Problems of Democratic Legitimacy’, in Porter, R. B., Sauvé, P., 
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